



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

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APR 14 1964

Dear John,

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is conducting a major study and re-evaluation of US arms control and disarmament policy for biological and chemical weapons. One aspect of this study is concerned with the problems posed by the possibility that Nth countries might acquire, or seek to acquire, a capability in BW or CW weapon systems in the next few years. Accordingly, ACDA has requested that a National Intelligence Estimate be prepared on the likelihood of proliferation of these weapons.

The proposed NIE should include a brief analysis of the technical and economic resources required to develop an indigenous BW and/or CW capability and should identify both potential Nth countries and non-nuclear powers which already have a BW or CW program. In estimating the likelihood that an Nth country will acquire BW or CW weapons systems, primary consideration should be given to the prospects for developing and producing these weapons without external assistance. However, the possibility that an Nth country might acquire them from another nation or through the efforts of a group of foreign experts should also be considered. In this connection, the proposed NIE should discuss the policies and attitude toward proliferation of foreign countries which already have BW or CW weapons.

We appreciate that the present schedule of NIEs is heavy, but hope that the requested estimate could be completed during the third quarter of 1964. Suggested terms of reference are attached.

Sincerely,

Thomas L. Hughes

Mr. John McCone,
Director of Central Intelligence,
CIA Headquarters,
Langley, Virginia.

State Department review completed

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(EXCERPT)

Likelihood of Proliferation of BW and CW Weapons Systems

Suggested Terms of Reference

Problem

To estimate the likelihood of proliferation of biological and chemical weapons systems during the period 1964-1967.

Scope

The estimate should consider both the likelihood of Nth countries' developing an operational battlefield capability with biological and/or chemical weapons and the likelihood of the Nth country's acquiring a token capability -- i.e., a capability to inflict mass casualties on the population of one (or a few) cities of a traditional enemy.

Both BW/CW agents and delivery means should be considered.

Questions Bearing on the Problem

A. Technical and Economic Resources Required

1. What are the minimum technical and economic resources required by an Nth country to develop and produce BW/CW agents and munitions on a scale sufficient to provide an operational battlefield capability? Estimate the financial costs of such programs and compare them with the costs of acquiring a token capability.

2. What potential Nth countries have the requisite resources? What is the earliest date by which they could begin to produce BW/CW agents and munitions?

3. What foreign countries other than the USSR already have BW/CW programs? Consider both laboratory scale development programs and production for stockpile. What is the level of technical sophistication of their programs? Are they engaged in research on new agents and new methods of delivery?

4. Discuss defensive requirements and the extent to which additional technical or economic resources would be needed by Nth countries and by countries which now have BW/CW research programs.

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B. Intentions of Potential Nth Countries

1. Which potential Nth countries are likely to acquire or seek to acquire an indigenous BW/CW capability in the next three years? By the end of the decade?

a. Is there any evidence of BW/CW research and testing activity at the present time?

b. Discuss the principal motivating factors for those countries most likely to produce BW/CW weapons for stockpile. Do they consider their BW/CW program a "poor man's substitute" for a nuclear weapons program?

2. Discuss the likelihood of potential Nth countries acquiring outside assistance for their BW/CW programs. What are the chances of Nth country joint programs, one Nth country buying BW/CW weapons from another, or using a group of foreign experts to develop a BW/CW program?

3. Discuss factors affecting Nth countries' intentions to employ or threaten to employ BW/CW weapons.

C. Policies and Attitudes Toward Proliferation of BW/CW Weapons

1. What are the policies and attitude of foreign countries which now have a BW/CW capability toward proliferation of these weapons?

2. Discuss the likelihood of change in these policies and attitudes if one or more Nth country acquires an indigenous BW/CW capability.

D. Implications of BW/CW Proliferation

1. Effects on traditional regional conflicts (UAR-Israel, India-Pakistan).

2. Effects on proliferation of nuclear weapons.

INR/SIS:HMWiedemann:mrp

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McCone

has been alerted that you wish to discuss this request at the USIB meeting tomorrow and he will pass the word to the Board. ONE has been alerted and they will be prepared to discuss it with you at the pre-USIB session.

21 April 1964
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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